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AN EVALUATION OF THE EFFICACY OF THE
FEDERAL INTEREST-SUBSIDY HOUSING PROGRAMS
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to provide historical documentation on th«
relative efficiency of the Sec. 235 (Sales) and Sec. 236 (Rental) housing
programs. While the research was in progress it was hoped it would be a
progress report on the efficiency of those programs. Now that HUD-FHA has
been directed to suspend new mortgage commitments on these programs, pending
investigation, it appears the study, though timely, will serve a different
purpose.
We wish to emphasize that this financial analysis constitutes applied
research in the area of political-economic studies. These housing programs
constitute a form of governmental intervention in the marketplace which makes
the methodology of economic theory somewhat inappropriate. One is forced
to consider not only economic feasibility but also political acceptability
because housing subsidy programs are per se a rejection of the orthodox
definitions of housing demand. This point is discussed later in the article.
We seek in this article to consider not only the beneficial effects of
achieving production goals, but also to weigh the costs of deleterious side
effects such as an overloading of FHA managerial capacity, the costs of
foreclosures which have occurred, and other matters.
An Overview of Housing Subsidies - Past and Present
Since 1937 the federal government has invested billions of dollars in
direct housing subsidies. Until the 1960s these subsidies were primarily
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limited to the poor of low-income families through public housing authorities.
During the 1960s, concern for millions of families living in deteriorated, even
delapidated, housing caused the nation to experiment with BMIR (below market-
interest rate) programs designed to provide eligible low-moderate income
families with assistance to lower cbeir shelter costs and raise the quality of
housing they occupied. Ultimately, in 1968 our Congress dedicated the nation
to a ten-year program designed to provide for the construction and rehabili-
tation of six million subsidized dwelling units and a stabilized construction
of twenty million unsubsidized units in the decade of 1968-1978. Two new
interest subsidy programs were created, Sec. 235 for sales housing and Sec.
236 for rental housing designed to produce 3,065,000 units. Under Secretary
Romney, a former auto production executive, we embarked on an unprecedented
effort to build housing at annual levels of production never before achieved.
The success of the HDD program in achieving three successive years of over
two million housing starts is remarkable. Hud-Subsidized Housing Production
played an important but minor role. Total production of conventional dwelling
units was 2,083,200 for 1971. Recognizing the importance of mobile homes, we
should add 491,700 mobile home units for a total production of 2,544,500 for
calendar year 1971. Total HUD-subsidized production for the year was 349,320
units or 13.77 percent. It will be quite instructive to see a table showing
a breakdown of fiscal 1972 production:

Table 1
HUD - Subsidized Production for Fiscal Year 1972
Sec. 235 Sec. 236
rotal Sec. 235 Public Housing Sec. 236 1-4 Rehab Multi-Fam. Rehab Othlgt!!
>8,469 111,293 51,902 101,875 13,554 18,032 *41,813
)urce: Department of Housing and Urban Development -Housing Production and Mortgage
Credit -FHA-Divis ion of Research and Statistics Revised 11/30/72
These units are all new dwelling units, primarily under state uninsured project programs.
You will note that in spite of the ambitious goals concerning rehabili-
tation set forth in our national housing goals that rehabilitation is relatively
insignificant, constituting 28,586 units, a mere 8.43 percent of the total.
It may be helpful to note that the production of various forms of subsidized
housing during fiscal year 1972 was nearly triple the subsidized housing starts
for all years combined up to 1967, the year before we embarked on this goal-
oriented program. Such extraordinary success at achieving production goals in
the social and political milieu of our American cities has its price. In some
^
cities extraordinary inefficiencies ir underwriting and appraisal practices,
particularly in Sec. 235 and Sec. 236 rehabilitated housing (8.4 percent of the
total) brought on indictments for bribery and scandal. Because the social
philosophy of some causes them to have a low tolerance level for subsidized
» housing, they were quick to attack the subsidy programs as unworkable.
Characteristics of Sec. 235 (Sales) and Sec. 236 (Rental) Programs
There is a general lack of understanding of these interest subsidy pro-
grams, not only on the part of the public, but also among the intellectual
class. This concern has arisen from the indiscriminate recent adverse publicity
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for all the government-assisted housing programs. The newspaper and journal
articles have been misleading. Unfortunately, It appears that this fallacious
information may well be the basis of program termination. To emphasize this
point, we call to your attention the mauy reports of numerous HUD-FHA fore-
closures in several cities (e.g. Detroit). In fact, there are relatively few
failures under either the Sec. 235 or Sec. 236 programs per se . Oakley Hunter,
president and chairman of the board of FNMA reported the FNMA experience, for
example, has been satisfactory, "Of the 1.2 million mortgages we own cover-
ing 1-4 family dwellings, approximately 156,000 are in Sec. 235 houses. Of
those 156,000 less than 2 percent are in foreclosures, 8.8 percent are delinquent
30 days, 2.4 percent are delinquent 60 days, and 1.3 percent are delinquent
90 days or more." In an effort to provide the reader with a better familiarity
with these important socially-motivated programs, we have set forth a descrip-
tion of the Sec. 235 and Sec. 236 programs and some statistical tables detailing
their characteristics.
Section 235 is a plan to subsidize the interest on FHA-insured mortgages
for dwellings constructed under the miuimum property standards of the Section
203 FHA single-family dwelling program. The program also covers cooperative
housing projects. The plan is to help lower-income families purchase their
own homes (or shares in cooperatives) by providing federal subsidies which are
generally the difference between 20 percent of a family's monthly income and
the required monthly payment for principal, interest, taxes, and insurance.
The effect is to reduce mortgage amortization costs to the borrower--to as
little as 1 percent --while allowing the lender the competitive rate of return
prevailing for mortgages on the open market.

Section 236 is a companion program which subsidizes the rental of multi-
family apartments. Non-profit and limited distribution sponsors of such
housing will receive federal funds to pay interest costs of privately financedj
mortgages in excess of the rate of 1 percent per annum. In-return, the spon-
sors must pass the savings realized from this subsidy on to their tenants,
who are to be charged a basic rent not exceeding 25 percent of their monthly
incomes. Our studies have shown that the neediest 17 percent of our popula-
tion will not be able to afford even this new housing without a rent supplement
program. According to HUD's calculations. Section 235 is meant for families
with a 1969 family income (after certain exemptions) ranging from $3,800 to
$5,200 per annum in most localities. Section 236 appears to be intended to
serve those with 1969 family incomes ranging from $3,500 to $7,300. We should
point out that these calculations were based on mortgage interest rates and
construction costs prevailing in 1968; and the minimum incomes for eligibility
are already higher. Since it is well established that families with incomes
of less than $3,500 per year pay 30 to 35 percent of their income for rent,
it is indisputable that these interest subsidy programs are no substitute for
low-rent public housing, leased housing. Section 23 rent certificates, rent
supplements , or some form of subsidy for those below the threshold of eligi-
bility for the Section 235 and Section 236 programs.
Though a more detailed discussion of owner-tenant eligibility and the
formulae used to determine the subsidy may be desirable apace limitations
preclude such a discussion. Such information has already been published.
Because few are aware that Sec. 235 and Sec. 236 housing has resulted in new
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housing with 30 percent lower costs than the regular FHA-insurance programs;
and that the percentage of foreclosure on the interest-subsidized dwelling units
is about 2 percent--a 98 percent success rate--we have set forth below some
comparative data to enable the reader to review the facts.
Table 2
COMPARATIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF NEW DWELLING UNITS
BUILT UNDER THE SAME MINIMUM PROPERTY STANDARDS
I - Section 235-Single~family Sales Housing (Subsidized)*
II - Section 203(b)-Single-family Sale Housing (Unsubsidlzed)
(Data represents the Median User and Sales Unit)
SECTION SECTION
Characteristics 2 35 (Subsidized) 203 (b) (Unsubsidized)
Sales price $18,218 $23,813
Living space 1,050 sq. ft. 1,223 sq. ft.
Lot size 9,586 sq. ft. 7,459 sq. ft.
Detached units 95% 91.6%
Age of family head 29 years 30.1 years
Monthly subsidy $76 None
Gross annual income $6,297 $13,487
Income, re-certification
(no longer taking subsidy) 6.8%
•k
-In HUD statistics a single family house is defir.ed to include owner occupied 1-4
family structures. This data repre&erts single - fatally structures only.
Source: HUD, Profile of Homeowners, (235) 3rvl Quorter 1971; FM Trends 2nd Quarter
1971,
A similar comparison of the regular IIUD-FHA multifamily program (Section
207) with the HUD multifamily interest subsidy program (Sec. 236) should
prove helpful:

Table 3
COMPARATIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF NEW DWELLING UNITS
BUILT UNDER THE SAME bfiNIMOM PROPERTY STANDARDS
I - Section 236-Multi-family unit-rental housing- (Subsidized)
II - Section 207 -Multi -family unit-rental housing~(Unsubs tdized)
(Data represents the Median tenant and median rental unit)
Characteristics
Project size in units (median)
Dwelling units (by structure type) median
Walk-up
Elevator
One -family
Median mortgage amount per unit
Median rent per unit
Average bedrooms per unit
Average price of land per dwelling unit
Median square feet per unit
Foreclosures (and assignments) as a
percent of insurance in force
at beginning of year
Annual gross income
Monthly Subsidy
Age of family head
Section 236
Multifamily
98.6
1.597.
$4,900
$85
27
Section 207
Multifamily
133.3
87.77o 63,47.
10.87. 30.87o
1.5%
$14,975 $15,172
$138.80 (basic) $227.24
2.1 1.6
$830 $1,082
815 915.3
0.637.
NA
None
NA
NOTE: All figures are from 1970 with the exception of default termination figures
which are preliminary figures for 1971. Annual gross income, monthly subsidy,
and age of family heads as of March 1971.
SOURCE: 1970 HUD Statistical Yearbook, pages 239 and 244.
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Current Foreclosure Rates
In view of the fact that the mass media, congress, and even the current
HUD have given us the impression that the interest subsidy programs are re-
sulting in foreclosures at a phenomenal and unbearable rate it is necessairy
to look at the actual data. We have set forth below the available quarterly
data on Section 235 foreclosure rates. Keep in mind that a foreclosure is
not a 100 percent loss. It is a foreclosure on a primary lien with the right
to a first claim against the proceeds at the public sale of the collateral
(i.e. land and improvements) which were pledged as security. In other words,
the loss sustained on the units foreclosed will be minimized. Furthermore,
all these units are a part of the FHA Special Risk Insurance pool, and are
insured against the risk of actual loss. Therefore, though this mutual
insurance fund will experience a loss representing the difference between the
proceeds of the public sale and the remaining balance of the mortgage, the
taxpayer will probably experience no loss whatsoever. We wish to acknowledge
that the foreclosure rate indicated is considerably higher than that experi-
enced under conventional mortgages; however, these programs constitute social
experimentation in authorizing loans to a user-class with which underwriters
have little experience. Further many of the new occupants have little expe-
rience with the use of credit and with property OTfmership responsibilities.
It is for that reason it is felt that the success rate of about 98 percent
must be viewed, preliminarily, as a success.
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SECTION 235 FORECLOSURE RATE
As a percent of insurance in force at beginning
of year (by month) 1970-71
1970 I9"71 1972
Jan. .78% 1.43% 1.92^
Apr. .46 1.56
June 1.67 2.19
Sep. 1.38 1.65
Dec. 1.49 2.02
SOURCE: HUD, FHA Division of Research and Statistics,
Statistical Sheet R-R S-390-H
In view of the data set forth above it is apparent that an objective
evaluation of the efficacy of these programs is timely. It is believed that
this study demonstrates the interest -subsidy programs are efficacious and
should be continued during the time their administration is improved and
refined.
The Problem of Political Acceptability
Speaking in terms of the political acceptability of these programs,
3leading business journals have been extremely critical of subsidized housing.
George Romney, former Secretary of HUD, sounded a warning that housing subsidies
4
were soaring and could exceed $200 billionl In retirement the naive, well-
meaning Romney continues his opposition to this method of stimulating housing
production in the low-to-low-moderate income housing market. Some scholars
have added their voice contending that the interest subsidy programs have
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probably increased over-all housing construction costs (and the costs of
subsidy) by as much as 25 percent over the ordinary rate of increase. All
this opposition to the use of the interest-subsidy programs has been aided
and abetted by the hoary traditional view of economic demand for housing
expressed by Renshaw recently v/hen he considered the demand for housing in
the Mid-1970s. Renshaw stated, "...Poor families, as a general rule, cannot
afford new housing..." This concept of housing demand is a product of the
theoretical economist's distinction between "effective demand" on the one
hand, and "need" or "non-economic demand" on the other. Effective demand is
defined as market-place demand, purchases which consumers have both the
desire and the economic means to make. While, "need" represents a judgment
independent of the marketplace. The inappropriateness of the theoretical
economist's definition should be obvious to anyone knowledgeable in the
area of housing. Our society long ago chose to act with governmental inter-
vention in dealing with the socio-economic and political problems of shelter.
The provision and use of housing is carried out in a marketplace significantly
distorted by many disparate governmental policies. We have chosen the goal
of, "...a decent home and a suitable living environment for every American
family ... .''^ precisely because a dwelling unit is more than a mere economic
good which satisfies non-pecuniary needs. The housing deficit which prompted
the creation of the interest subsidy programs has been xjell documented else-
9
where. In an earlier research report this writer examined the many economic,
social, and political forces which affect the efficient production of housing
toward meeting our national housing goals. The report gave careful consider-
ation to land, labor, materials, interim financing costs, mortgage credit
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availability, the probable level of interest rates, and other factors as to
how they would affect the reallocation of resources necessary to meet the
housing goals. Therefore, we will not discuss these matters here. Krissof
and others have considered our federal housing policies and their relation-
11
ship to the variously defined process of "filtering." In spite of the
12
attempt of scholars to lay to rest the dubious theory of "filtering" the
mass media keeps it alive as the alleged effective panacea to our social
problem of "housing needs." As recently as November 20, 1972 the editors of
the Wall Street Journal stated, "...the great majority of low-income families
rely on the private market for housing. Their shelter is upgraded by occu-
13pancy of housing vacated by upwardly mobile families."
The federal interest-subsidy programs were enacted for the direct pur-
pose of stimulating the production of new housing nearer the bottom of the
filtering chain, than a surplus production of luxury housing with the hope that
it would accelerate the exodus of sub-standard housing from the stock. In
order to do so the programs must produce new construction which will provide
wider choice and better buys for the s b-market affected (low- to low-moderate-
incorae families in the area). It is an established fact that the homebuilding
industry has not produced a significant quantity of new dwelling units selling
for less than $18,000 for over a decade. We have been dependent on the
mobile home industry for new dwelling units which low- to low-moderate -income
families can afford to purchase according to underwriting standards. The
only other supply available has been the existing housing stock which has
deteriorated faster in quality than It has lowered in rent price. Lack of
code compliance activity, low vacancy levels, oscillating mortgage credit,
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etc, have all worked together to cause an observed social problem. The
existence of "housing deficit" families is a result of the failure of
filtering. These are families who are in the low- and low-moderate- income
brackets. Their relative ability to pay forces many of them to purchase
housing which is deteriorated and too often belov/ code standards of llv-
ability. As stated by Ratcliff, "Filtering. .. is not a controllable device.
The end product of filtering at the bottom of the chain reaction is sub-
standard housing, thus filtering produces the very blight which we seek to
remedy." Another social problem which lurks within the "filtering"
theory fomented by economic theorists, is the long time-horizon necessary
to move a dwelling unit down the chain of value so it is available to our
low- to low-moderate-income families. Though very little work has been
done in this area it appears that the time-period necessary to bring price
down to the level affordable by families at the bottom exceeds two gener-
ations. In such a time span (40-50 years) the process of ordinary fair,
wear, tear, and aging may bring about Incurable physical deterioration and
probably functional obsolescence. This would probably cause a quality rating
of below minimum property standards. Keep in mind that this ignores the
effects of neighborhood depreciation in value brought about by neighborhood
change. We have emphasized this point because since 1968 70.0 percent of
the new one-four family dwelling units have been sold for $20,000 or more.
The median selling price of new housing has not gone below $24,700 since
1968. It appears clear that in spite of social opposition and strong support
of the 'trickle -down' filtering theory this nation did chose to Intervene at
a different and lower point on the calibrated scale of filtering. They
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chose the interest subsidy program to produce housing for families In the
annual income range of $4,600 - $15,000. We were simply attempting to shorten
the time that it took for better quality housing to 'filter' down to the
bottom level. In addition, it was hoped that by increasing the supply of
housing available to our low- to low-moderate -income families the competitive
affect would be to exert downward pressure on rents and prices in the rele-
vant sub-market. This expansion of supply at the lower end of the scale was
to find its release of pressure by accelerating demolition of blighted and
delapidated dwellings. It now appears that new mortgage commitments under
the Sec. 235 and Sec. 236 interest-subsidy programs shall be suspended for
a period of eighteen months by the Office of Management and Budget ostensibly
to provide HUD with sufficient time to decide whether subsidizing housing is
worth the cost. Assistant-Secretary Norman Watson of HUD states, "...HUD
represents a social area that is out of step with the White House, there
always was that sense of getting out of hand, of being out of step with the
politics, of being unable to communicate.
.
.In this particular job (i.e.
housing managment) there is no way you can look good. The more housing you
build, the more it will cost in operating subsidies, the more exposure there
is to defaults, foreclosures, and scandals. The White House looks at costs,
defaults, foreclosures and scandals."^" It is the position of this paper that
politically inspired rhetoric has taken the place of research. Indifference
to the facts has replaced fair investigation. For example, Breckenfeld quotes
unidentified HUD officials as predicting that the annual cash costs of subsidies
will rise to about $7.5 billion a year by 1978, and that the subsidies could
reach $200 billion before the loans on the projects are retired. It is
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important to note that Breckenfeld's article has been cited as the authori-
tative source by the plethora of clamorous articles which followed. Indeed,
a scholarly journal reprinted Breckenfeld's polemical statement (which called
for the White House to impound funds already appropriated)
,
Yet, our own investigation of the interest subsidy programs indicates
beyond a reasonable doubt that the interest subsidy programs' annual cash
costs will not exceed $2,091 billion in 1978 which is the highest possible
year and that the total costs will not exceed $18,789 billion dollars over
the entire subsidy period which it is estimated will end, under present
law, in 1992. Clearly the use of federal financial aid for housing has
great difficulty maintaining an acceptable political image because of the
tactics of those who oppose. It is the purpose of this paper to provide
the results of an exhaustive computer analysis of the probable costs of the
interest-subsidy programs to the federal government. The facts will make
it clear that those who have believed the analysis of the articles cited
have been misled.
The real tragedy is that our 'housing deficit' families will pay the
social costs; due to the probable discontinuance of these relatively new
programs which are still in their early years of development. Because the
1973 turnover in personnel at HUB brings in staff unaware of what has gone
on before, it appears the nation will repeat its past error of discarding
existing low- to low-moderate -housing programs which are efficacious while
turning to experimental new forms of subsidy as though they are the definitive
answer. During the 1960s we had Sec. 221(d) (3), Sec, 231, and Sec. 202. In
spite of congressional skimping on appropriations, and HHFA (now HUD) delays
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in setting up procedures, developers were finally convinced the programs
were functional and here to stay. As a result nearly 70 percent of the
units built under those programs were built at the end of the decade.
However, when meaningful levels of production were finally achieved the
programs were phased out and replaced by the more fashionable interest
subsidy programs. Any experienced real estate developer knows that the
long time-horizon necessary for budgeting a large housing project requires
much more predictable bureaucratic actions. It is not only frustrating
but even unwise to embark on the PHA-HUD pre -application feasibility
studies knowing the rules will change or the program be terminated or
suspended during your pre-planning stage. In view of the 'on-again' and
'off -again' history it appears that whatever form the programs do take
strong incentives will be necessary to persuade skilled developers to
continue to participate in the production process necessary to supply the
needed dwelling units. This is because their profits are higher in other
types of development without controls. Keep in mind that writers such as
Schussheim have indicated a major constraint on the production of new hous-
ing for low-moderate income families has been the limited number of qualified
18
sponsors. Even if we turn to housing allowance vouchers we will still be
dependent on skilled developers to produce the necessary new units, unless
we are willing to consider the possibility that housing allowances will be
used to pay for substandard housing. Such folly would, of course, set us on
another round of defaults, foreclosures, and scandals. It appears clear
that program continuity is a worthy objective in view of the frustrating
inefficiencies that result from changing to new programs because they seem
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more politically acceptable at the moment. It is advocated here that though
there have been very serious managerial problems during the "start-up" years
of the interest -subsidy programs those same problems of managerial efficiency
would be implicit in any program involving welfare transfer payments to pro-
vide decent housing for our low- to low-moderate-income families. More
important, it appears that many of the alternatives (e.g. housing allowances)
may not act as an adequate incentive on the supply-side of the housing
equation to bring about the production of standard housing in the low- to
low-moderate -income housing market. Filtering from the high-moderate and
luxury market down to the lower income levels has already been rejected by
this article because its glacial movement is rated unacceptably slow and
inefficient. The imperfect marketplace's failure to perform adequately has
caused us to turn to government intervention which also works with imper-
fections. It is desirable for us to take a close look at the imperfections
resulting from the use of the interest-subsidy programs to consider whether
or not they can be overcome, or, do these imperfections produce costs which
require termination of the Sec. 235 and Sec. 235 programs. It will also
prove worthwhile to consider the more obvious drawbacks which are implicit
in other programs which have loyal adherents, though they are largely
untested, the negative income tax and housing allowance programs.
Testing the To leranc e Level of our Imperfect Housing Programs
Serious and costly side-effects have arisen in both the Sec. 235 (Sales)
housing program and the Sec. 236 (multi-family rental) housing programs.
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In Sec. 235 housing we have had five basic problems. First, site
availability for new construction has been limited tor 1) new subdivisions
on the urban fringes of our metropolitan areas where most of this housing
has been built; 2) scattered sites in the inner city areas, many times in
deteriorated neighborhoods. Second, it has been alleged that in too many
of our major cities the FHA underwriting standards have been lax and even
subject to bribery and fraud. Third, the appraising of existing and
rehabilitated units offered for FHA insurance has been often incompetent
and sometimes dishonest. Fourth, sometimes the new class of owner-
occupants, due to a lack of a heritage of experience in buying homes, have
purchased properties which failed to meet code standards (often depending
on a naive belief that a FHA sale was in some way guaranteed by the federal
government to be of merchantable quality). Fifth, it has been alleged that
the cost of the subsidy to the tax payer will be so large that the program
has already proven unworkable. Taking each of these so-called basic prob-
lems in there turn let us consider whether they are caused by the nature
of the interest subsidy program, and whether they are a minimal economic
cost which we should bear because the benefits of producing the additional
low- to low-moderate -housing units far outweighs these costs.
Site Selection Problems
First, the problem of sufficiency in site availability for single-
family housing in our large metropolitan areas is a nation-wide socio-
political problem unrelated to the interest-subsidy programs. We seek sites
which will provide decent, safe, and sanitary housing within the financial
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means of the occupants, and at convenient locations . Since many of the
would-be occupants are non-white minority families, elderly with low incomes,
and lower skill workers, it should be obvious that regardless of the pro-
gram adopted the problem of obtaining sites convenient to the journey to
work, shopping, etc. are more a result of class separation, and the move-
ment of industry which has occurred in the past twenty years, than any
housing subsidy program. Since this problem has been adequately discussed
elsewhere we will treat it as a given that this is not a cost of the
interest-subsidy programs. We add the comment that if all aids to low- to
low-moderate -income families were suspended this problem would not go away.
The other problem of site availability concerns the use of scattered
sites in the inner city for new housing. It is impossible to ignore that
placing a new unit in a neighborhood which has deteriorated; where the
municipal infrastructure is poorly maintained and aged; where police and
fire protection along with garbage protection are below the per capita cost
standards of newer neighborhood; is a risky enterprise. It has been urged
that the new construction along with other HUD-aids may result in a reversal
of the trends and bring on a wave of rehabilitation and conservation.
Certainly, it would seem that the government with its broad-base is the
appropriate lender of last resort for such a risky enterprise. However,
these efforts at neighborhood rejuvenation should not be thought of as the
interest subsidy programs. In fact, they are actually a result of another
congressional statute which modified HUD-FHA underwriting standards. Sec.
223(e).
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Sec. 223(e) --The Deteriorated Neighborhood Mortgage Program
Though Sec. 223(e) is not an interest-subsidy program, nor, was it
intended to result in subsidy to the owner-occupants, it is necessary to
comment on Sec. 223(e) mortgages because many writers have confused them
with our subsidy programs.
As a result of congressional concern over the FHA practice of "red-
lining" certain neighborhoods as unacceptable "high-risk" areas, congress
attempted to modify this practice in the 1968 Housing and Urban Development
Act. The motives were commendable for "red-lining" had resulted in non-
white racial discrimination in our major cities because blacks, spanish-
americans , etc. tended to be crowded into these "unacceptable risk"
neighborhoods. However, Sec. 223(e) placed a burden on FHA underwriting
personnel which may have been too difficult to meet. A close reading of
the statutory language is in order:
"...the Secretary is authorized upon application by the mortgagee to
insure under any section of this title (i.e. all FHA mortgage programs) a
mortgage executed in connection with the repair, rehabilitation, construc-
tion, or purchase of property located in an older, declining urban area in
which conditions are such that one or more of the eligibility requirements
applicable to the section or title (i.e. programs such as 203, 235, 207,
and 236, etc.) under which the insurance is sought could not be met , if
the Secretary finds that (1) the area is reasonably viable, giving con -
sideration to the need for providing adequate housing or group practice
facilities for families of low and moderate income housing in such area
,
and (2) the property is an acceptable risk in view of such consideration.
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The insurance of a mortgage pursuant to this subsection shall be the
'obligation of the Special Risk Insurance Fund . (See Sec. 238.) (Under-
20lining and paranthetical information supplied by the writer.)"
This congressional response to the inner-city riots of 1967 must have
been bewildering to the HUD-FHA underwriters and ranking officers. They
were being directed to accept risks that would otherwise be rejected in
neighborhoods which were rated "high-risk" because physical deterioration
was already eroding property values. Under Sec. 223(e) conventional under-
writing risk evaluation standards such as: credit characteristics of the
applicant; degree of motivation toward ownership; loan-to-value ratio
(i.e. of the down payment); adequacy of income; stability of income;
adequacy of income in relation to all monetary obligations; were all to be
waived to some extent. In the meanwhile Congress provided a beginning
appropriation of $20,000,000 to start the revolving fund necessary to pay
losses which in theory were to be covered by the FHA insurance premium
charges of % percent on the remainlt^g balance of the mortgages all of which
were to be out of the Special Risk Insurance Fund
. To waive the above
underwriting standards along with requiring the FHA to insure in these
"older declining areas" was to attempt to repeal immutable economic laws.
To require HUD area directors to make a determination that: -"the area is
reasonably viable"- when our best urban planners and urban economists have
been unable to make such determinations for selecting urban renewal project
areas, was astonishing. It is not surprising that FHA underwriting personnel
throughout the country felt Congress had issued a $20,000,000 first install-
ment on a "blank-check," issued for political an4 social reasons which defied
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economic good sense. Because the Sec. 223(e) losses are charged against the
same Special Risk Fund as the Sec. 235, Sec. 236, Sec. 233, and Sec. 237
programs it has resulted in Special Risk Fund Losses which are used as an
indication of the failure of our low- to low-moderate -income housing programs.
It should be obvious that Sec. 223(e) losses are unrelated to losses resulting
from ordinary mortgages insured under the Sec. 235 and Sec. 236 intereat-
subsidy programs which are the subject of this paper. Though the mandate of
the Sec. 223(e) directive has resulted in some financial disaster in the
financing of existing and rehabilitation housing in inner city neighborhoods
of our major cities it is a gross mispresentation to attribute this to the
theory or practice of the interest subsidy programs. However, it is true
that the introduction of Sec. 235 which paralleled the regular Sec. 203 pro-
gram, along with Sec. 236 which paralleled the regular Sec. 207 program did
cause some confused thinking among certain "old-line" senior HUD-FHA officials,
This was because some FHA underwriters had difficulty wearing two hats, one,
for the regular prof it -motivated programs (Sec. 203 and 207); and another for
our socially-motivated programs (Sec. 235 and Sec. 236) in which rents were
to be controlled; income of eligible families was to be regulated; and con-
struction standards were to be modest to keep costs down. The difference in
criteria for evaluation of applicants continues to be a problem. Some have
seriously suggested we must separate the regular sales and profit-motivated
programs from those which are seeking to achieve social goals because of
the inflexibility of the underwriting personnel.
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Underwriting Problems
Tills leads us to our second problem the extent of lax underwriting
standards in our Sec. 235 and Sec. 236 programs. Whatever the case may be,
it is clear that ordinary applicants under these programs continue to meet
the same standards for ability-to-pay (with the subsidy, of course) as
applicants have for decades. Determination of adequacy of income, stability
of income, moral risk, health, occupation, local economic conditions, etc.
are necessary considerations in measuring the quality of a loan-insurance
risk. On the other hand, the failure to develop standards for evaluating
the risk implicit in loaning to eligible occupants under the Sec. 223(e)
and Sec. 237 programs cannot be excused. Since such loans were often
character loans; references should have been Investigated; rent-payment
records investigated, credit records considered; i.e. the risk evaluation
practices long ago developed in the small loan companies for signature loans
could have been adopted and modified. Simply because that program opened
the door to a new kind of borrower was no reason for assuming there were to
be no standards of acceptability. It is of interest to note that Lawrence
Katz, HDD Director of the Milwaukee office, clearly demonstrated that good
\mderwriting practices, ethical appraising, and orientation of the owners
to their responsibilities could result in low delinquency and default rates.
Under the pressure of the unprecedented voltme brought about by Sec. 223(e),
we should not be surprised if laxity occurred in other application reviews.
Actually there was an all time record volume for all FHA- insurance programs
combined, a particularly high Increase in 1969 and 1970. However, we can
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look to more than mere statistics to understand why underwriting and apprais-
ing practices slipped in quality. There was a freeze, and even a reduction,
in staffing required at the same time work loads were increasing at this un-
precedented rate. HUD-FHA was pressed through a massive reorganization,
which will probably be beneficial in the long-run, however, in the meanwhile
the greatly overloaded staff v/as required to move their physical plant to
new quarters in most cities, thousands of applications were temporarily lost.
Again this problem of managerial efficiency can not be attributed to the
ti- ture or impact of the interest -subsidy programs.
The third problem considered is largely in appraisal practices.
Historically, anytime mortgage funds became abundant there has been an un-
fortunate tendency for real estate financing to be willing to bear higher
loan-to-value ratios and condone nonchalant appraisal practices. The period
from 1970-1973 has been no exception. Hopefully the glare of publicity on
the sloppy appraising practices of FHA, during this time of heavy pressure
on their personnel, will force the nation to realize we need an appraisal
profession with the power to enforce a code of ethics on its membership.
The HLBB has made a major step in a recent directive which discourages the
unfortunate past practice of savings and loan associations using their board
of directors for "committee appraisal" of properties offered for loan col-
lateral. The ideal answer is to require values to be established by professional
fee appraisers of proven expert qualifications. Unfortunately, the ntmiber of
members of the Appraisal Institute (MAIs) and members of the Society of Real
EsL^te Appraisers (SREAs) is small in relation to the number who would be
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needed under such a rule. However, it is believed that given an affirmative
policy decision by the various governmental agencies favoring independent,
expert, ethical fee -appraising we would see a quick market response result-
ing in new entrants to the vocation-profession. In the meanwhile, we must
remain dependent upon HUD auditors, GAO investigations, and the Justice
Department to force responsible appraising practices under the threat of
criminal indictment.
It appears certain that the vast majority of the defaults will return
substantial monies from the public sales of the collaterial. It is instruc-
tive to note that virtually all the defaults which will result in a high
percentage loss to the mutual Insurance pool are in deteriorated neighborhoods
where the risk of erosion of value (due to continuing decline of the environs)
was highly probable. Before going on to the next problem, we wish to empha"
size that a demoralizing injustice will result from indiscriminate blanket
accusation of all FHA-HUD personnel involved. The professionals who have
worked under the stigma of recent scandals must be assured the public recog-
nizes their value or the government will lose them to private practice. It
is hoped the new HUD administration will recognize the need for a cadre who
will provide the necessary continuity to achieve improved appraisal methods.
Insured Properties and Code Compliance Faults
The fourth problem to be considered arises from the fact that some of
the properties insured under various FHA programs were in violation of local
housing, plumbing, fire, electrical, and other code requirements. Further,
some had inoperable mechanical equipment, leaking roofs, etc. Unfortunately,
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the purchasers seem to have been lulled into a false sense of security because
it was an FHA "guaranteed" purchase. This is in spite of the fact the FHA
insurance had no relationship to the risks of habitable condition. Hlstorica]
real estate transactions have followed the well settled rule of "caveat emptor i''^
with the seller making no warranties as to fitness for purpose intended or
fair average quality. However, it is clear that in the case of the new class
of buyers covered by the interest-subsidy programs and Sec. 223(e) they were
in need of aid in selection of their new homes. In retrospect it seems obvious
that inspection by persons qualified to determine sound physical condition
was a necessity. We call to your attention that an ethical appraiser though
qualified to determine fair market value does not represent himself as an
expert on structural, mechanical, or safety conditions. Clearly, especially
in existing housing there was a need for an expert such as an architect,
engineer, building contractor, or experienced artisan, to actually inspect
the premises to determine the soundness of the physical structure and improve-
ments. Much of the scandal and alleged corruption amenated from the deceitful
practice of sellers who would disguise and cover up defects in the property
with cosmetic work which was mispresented as a rehabilitation. Since we are
speaking of the discovery of fraud it should be obvious that expert inspec-
tion was necessary. It is of great importance to note that many HUD-FHA.
regional offices belatedly did add this inspection function to the application
review process. It appears such personnel is available on a fee basis from
among older and semi-retired building trades members as well as the pro-
fessions noted. It would seem that a fair fee should be paid by the buyer
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out of mortgage proceeds to determine: 1) fair market value and sound loan
value, and 2) sound physical condition, and the absence of significant code
violations. It would seem to be an excellent form of insurance against the
reality of a market in which fraudulent sellers exist. It is clear that
the author believes these very real problems implicit in the art of apprais-
ing and the underwriting decision are manageable and that costs can be
minimized. It is now time to comment on the costs to the interest subsidy
programs resulting from the unfortunate overloading of the FHA underwriting
and valuation personnel as well as the dishonesty which has resulted in the
foreclosure of undesirable properties.
This may be one of the most important paragraphs in the article,
because the facts revealed the measurable trend of losses appear manageable.
Except for 223(e) most of the losses are in rehabilitated housing. As
previously noted rehabilitation of existing housing constitutes a very low
percentage of the Sec. 235 or Sec. 236 subsidized housing. For example as
of November 1970 only 24 projects consisting of 163 rehabilitated units had
been insured under the Sec. 235 rehabilitation program. Looking at more
recent statistics we find that of the 204,454 subsidized unites produced
from January-October 1972 we have 960 units under Sec. 235 rehab and 8,136
under Sec. 236 and 221(d) (3) BMIR rehab. In other words, many of the losses
have been drawn from a non-representative sample (rehab-vs. new) which con-
stitutes an insignificant 4.81 percent of the total. Reference to Table 1 of
this article will show that in Fiscal Year 1972 rehabilitation constituted
only 8.43 percent of the total. It is unfair for politically inspired writers
to use such dramatic and misleading examples from the rehabilitation sector
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of the program when the overall delinquency rate is about 8 percent and the
default rate as previously mentioned is an overall 2 percent and even lower
in the new construction part of the programs. We hasten to add that in their
ignorance such writers may have confused the Sec. 115, Sec. 312, and Sec.
223(e) grant and loan programs -with the Sec. 235 and Sec. 236 programs which
were the subject of their attack. It seems worthwhile to make a caricature
of these charges. If 100 percent of the 14,145 units rehabilitated under
Sec. 235 and Sec. 236 during fiscal year 1972 were to go through default;
and public sale of the collateral were to result in a $10,000 loss per unit
(this is ludicrous I) the loss would be $141,450,000 throughout the nation.
Yet the media represented the potential loss to be $200,000,000 in Detroit,
Mich., alonel It is hoped that our redundancy has made clear that the losses
to date will be small by any reasonable estimate when compared with unprece-
dented levels of production achieved in all sectors of housing production.
If any tentative conclusion may be drawn it is that the desire on the part
of the current administration to break all records may have temporarily over-
loaded the managerial capacity of HUD-FHA.
Current Status of the Special Risk Insurance Fund
A preliminary review of the Special Risk Mutual Insurance Fund, as of
21
June 30, 1971 seems to indicate that this fund is having the typical begin-
ning year difficulties of any insurance reserve which has been set aside for
underwriting risks on which their is insufficient actuarial experience to
estimate probable losses. The experience to date is too limited for the basis
of decision making. As most are aware the insurance premium charge is % percent
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of the remaining mortgage balance. This charge is imposed on all the risks
covered by the pool (i.e. Sec. 223(6), 235, 236, 233, and 237 programs).
Further it is assumed that they will be paying the insurance premium of % of op*
percent for about twelve (12) years, based on typical experience. Therefore,
it should be clear that heavy losses in early years will be off set by premium
payments over time. It is obvious that Sec. 223(e) has imposed heavy losses
to date. Unfortunately, the available statistical data fails to separate
Sec. 223(e) from the others in the pool. It would be desirable for such data
to be made available for analysis. A crude analysis indicates that of over
541,000 units insured about 8,350 units have defaulted through June 30, 1971.
The acquisition costs of these units (1971 dollars) averaged $15,604 each.
The proceeds on properties sold were $11,758 per unit for a loss to the
Special Risk Fund of $4,266 per unit. It should be noted that taxes, main-
tenance and operating expenses during the holding period (average 7 months)
were about $2,600 per unit or 61 percent of the loss per unit. Such a charge
for indirect costs is atypical and should have further analysis. Under the
well established Sec. 203 insurance program the same charges have constituted
16 percent of the loss or $2,696 per unit. Such comparisons are of doubtful
validity, however, because the Sec. 203 experience extends over 30 years
while the Special Risk Insurance Fund is for practical purposes only about
three (3) years old. In summary, the losses are within reasonable limits in
view of the overload upon management, problems of underwriting and appraising,
etc. Overtime the risk appears manageable although Congress may be required
to make advances to the fund while it awaits the accumulation of reserves
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from premiums paid. Some consideration should be given to a slight Increase
In the insurance premium rate if experience Is adverse. An increase at this
time vould be premature.
HUD-FHA Pioneers Site Selection Criteria for Multi-Family Projects
It is necessary and desirable to discuss the special problem of Sec. 236
multi-family projects. All the foregoing discussion is, in a general sense,
relevant to the multi-family programs. One essential difference is worthy
of separate discussion, site selection and project management.
There is no question that the low site density-ratios which HUD-FHA
did impose on Sec. 236 projects caused an immediate problem in finding sites
in metropolitan areas, let alone selecting them. Experience by families
occupying various high rise sites tends to suggest HUD-FHAs decision was
wise; however, it did make it quite difficult to find sites in the inner-
city which had low enough land costs per dwelling unit to be feasible. It
should also be said that the diseconomies of scale implicit in FHA-Form 2013
methods of financing militated against projects with less than 90-100 units
\^ich made it even more difficult to find inner-city sites. Of course, the
resistance to low- to low-moderate-income families entering the suburban
fringes has been well documented. All of these things have tended to force
up land prices for Sec. 236 projects as with all others. In spite of these
socio-economic pressures, the average price of land per dwelling unit In
Sec. 236 housing is $830 as compared with Sec. 207 (regular profit-motivated
projects) where it is $1,082. More Important as a percent of the Median
mortgage amount per unit the Sec. 236 projects have a raw land cost per
dwelling unit of 5.64 percent while Sec. 207 comes in at 7.15 percent. We
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hasten to add that these are statistical averages and therefore we are
aware that probably some unjustified windfalls have occurred as happens in
free enterprise. A government policy requiring impartial appraisals by
professionals could do much to ward off that particular demon. In addition,
much has been said about poor site selection for the interest subsidy pro-
grams. However HUD-FHA did respond quickly to an actual need. In 1971
HUD-FHA set up site selection criteria for the multi-family interest subsidy
program to minimize poor site selection. It is saddening that the current
administration has suspended mortgage commitments which might have put these
site selection criteria to the test of actual experience in a significantly
large number of projects. On the face of it the criteria seem to be a
careful and deliberate attempt to fulfill the socially-motivated purpose of
the Sec. 236 program while still achieving project success. Simply stated
the criteria set up priority of funding on the basis of the rating achieved
by the project under eight project criteria. Ratings of superior, adequate
and poor are given. A single "poor" disqualifies a project. The criteria
are:
(1) Need for low(er) income housing in the local economy.
(2) Minority housing opportunities.
(3) Improved location for lower income families.
(4) Relationship of the project to orderly growth and development.
(5) Relationship of the proposed project to the physical environment.
(6) Ability of the Contractor and/or the sponsor to carry out the
project.
(1) Project potential for creating minority employment and business
opportunity.
?2
(8) Provision for sound housing management."
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It seems fair to say that most of the criteria should apply across the
board to all kinds of projects from luxury to low-rent public housing. An
adequate test of these criteria could do much to improve the quality of
pre-planning and market research that is done by all real estate developers.
The same should be said for the new HUD-FHA affirmative marketing plans and
affirmative management plans. Clearly, the position is taken here that
HUD-FHA has moved vigorously and boldly to bring about orderly development
of multi-family interest-subsidy projects. The author believes the site
selection criteria should be extended to Sec. 207 and Sec. 221(d) (4)
projects, which are without subsidy, so the government can properly use
these laws to demonstrate socially responsible development.
Fifth, we must deal with the most important problem, the ultimate cost
to the taxpayer of the subsidy to the occupants of Sec. 235 and Sec. 236
housing. Keeping in mind the goal is to provide decent housing for housing
deficit families, it is fair to say that if the cost is inordinate the
program should be terminated. Certainly, if the potential cost were even
near the total of $200 billion quoted by Breckenfeld of Fortune magazine
it would at present be politically unacceptable. In calling upon our tax-
payer to reallocate our national resources for over a decade in order to
achieve the end of decent housing for the average American it would seem
we should provide more accurate estimates. In 1968 the report to the
Sparkman Committee conveniently ignored all subsidies after 1978, thereby
23
underestimating the subsidy likely to occur by almost $10 billion. Now,
the current HUD-FHA administration has cast out reason and estimated the
subsidy by extrapolations which maximize the worst of circumstances thereby
overestimating the subsidy by many billions of dollars. We have chosen to
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develop a computer program which would simulate the production of Sec. 235
and Sec. 236 housing under "pessimistic"; "optimistic"; and "most likely"
circumstances from 1968-1978 plus the amount of all subsidies until they
were no longer required.
In 1972 the computer model was refined and broadened to simulate pro-
duction for each year assuming: "deflationary"; "most likely"; and "highly-
inflationary" macro-economic circumstances. It is important to note that
ve chose to forecast the maximum subsidy likely to occur under the three
sets of circvmstances. Therefore, our estimates of the costs of appro-
priation should be viewed as conservative. We have set forth below a
narrative of the basic structure of our computer model.
Description of the Computer Model
Our major research objective was to calculate the cost to the federal
government of the interest subsidy programs. To achieve that end it was
necessary to set up a prototypical Section 235 dwelling unit and a Section
236 multi-family dwelling unit which would represent the 1968 construction
costs for all the dwelling units to be built each year under the program.
By examining actual projects in the field, we determined thi» user-needs for
dwelling unit size for each program under Federal Housing Administration
(FRA) minimum property standard controls. In effect, we were seeking to
determine the kinds of dwelling units most likely to be built under the
program and the proportion of the total number produced each year which were
likely to be of a certain kind and size (e.g., single-family sales housing!
1-, 2-, or 3-bedroom) . We then determined by the use of actual FHA projects
/221(d) (3), 203, 207, 2137 and some low-rent housing projects the 1968-1969
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actual construction costs per dwelling unit for the various 1-, 2-, and
3-bedroom dwelling units. We verified the reasonableness of these con-
struction costs with architects, contractors, housing consultants, and two
conferences with FHA personnel. Having satisfied ourselves of the reli-
ability of our beginning year (1969) actual construction costs for each
class of prototypical dwelling units, we were then ready to construct a
computer model which would calculate through an iterative and recursive
process: the annual production cost for each type of dwelling unit; the
necessary rents or payments to amortize the unit; the threshold of family
income for eligibility; and the difference between the shelter costs
actually paid by the occupant (i.e., "basic rent") and the total dwelling-
unit costs (i.e., "market rent") by which the subsidy is determined each
year. The computer would then use the national goals each year as a multi-
plier to determine the total annual subsidy, and continue calculating the
subsidy so long as the occupant remained eligible each year thereafter .
In order to estimate properly the annual construction costs, shelter
costs and the subsidy, it was necessary to modify each component of the
construction costs and the occupants' shelter costs by our judgmental esti-
mates of the probable rates of change. Therefore the computer model did in
a stepwise fashion calculate the Impact of annual changes in construction
costs, amortization, personal incomes, land costs, real estate taxes, and
insurance as they affected both sides of the equation. As a result,
although we started out with prototypical dwelling units for the Section
235 (sales) and Section 236 (rental) housing programs for the year 1969, the
costs of construction and the costs of occupancy were clearly modified each
year in the computer analysis as though the units were built.
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We wish to make it clear that our judgments as to rates of change were
not the only factors vxhich affected the ultimate totals of the congressional
appropriations. We were forced to decide the size of the dwelling units
(i.e., how many square feet per 3-bedroom apartment). We chose to bias our
analysis in accordance with controls currently imposed by FHA on would-be
developers. Because the subsidy programs invoke certain immutable economic
laws which place limits on the minimum incomes of eligible occupants, we
were forced to choose the kinds of housing likely to be built within the goals
of the programs. We chose a mix of 1-, 2-, and 3-bedroom units based on
current FHA practices and discussions in the field with those engaged in
building this type of housing. However, it should be clear that if^ FHA per-
mits more spacious dwelling units, or the construction of a higher proportion
of 3-, 4-, and 5 -bedroom units then our inputs to our computer model would
change, as would our resulting calculations of subsidies. It should be
obvious that the total subsidy and the construction cost estimates are largely
dependent on the reasonableness of our assximptions
.
Since the 1971 runs of the computer model have come within reasonable
tolerances of projecting the. probable costs to the federal government of
subsidizing the interest costs resulting from the HUD Sec. 235 and Sec, 236
low- to low-moderate-income housing programs; the major purpose of the new
analysis was to establish limits above and below which it was unlikely the
subsidy totals would range over the life of the program. In order to enable
the reader to evaluate the "realism" of these judgmental assumptions the
writer has set forth below these critical input variables.
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Table 4
DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES **
Recapitulation and Summary of Judgmental Models for Inputs to Housing
Production Process to Determine Level of Subsidy as Prepared by This Report
Input Item Percent Rates of Change
and Other Items
This Report
Dwelling unit size
Minimum property standards
1-bedroom - 550 sq ft
2
-bedroom - 760 sq ft
3
-bedroom - 960 sq ft
Type of construction
236
Elevator
Modular
Walk-up
235
Single family
1-4 family
157<. - elevator
15% - modular
707o - walk-up
1007o single family
Estimated proportion of
each size unit produced
each year
107« - 1-bedroom
207„ - 2 -bedroom
607o - 3 -bedroom
Land cost +67, per annum
Ratio of land cost to
total cost
236 8% for high-rise
207, for walk-ups and
other
235 207o - single family
Amortization term
236
235
40 years
3 years (rehab 20 years)
Interim financing costs +157o per dwelling each
year
I - "Optimistic" - Mortgage Contract Rate - 6% (includes FHA i.p.);
Construction Cost (labor and material) to increase at 4,27o per annum;
Family Income is expected to rise by 3.07o per annum. This provides
for a labor cost increase of 6.07o per annum.
II - "Most Likely" - Mortgage Contract Rate - 7.57, (includes FHA i.p.);
Construction Cost (labor and material) to increase at 4.77o per annum;
Family Income is expected to rise by 8.07, per annum. This provides for
a labor cost increase of 8. 07, per annum.
Ill - "Pessimistic" - Mortgage Contract Rate - 8.57. (includes FHA i.p.);
Construction Cost (labor and material) to increase at 87, per annum;
Family Income is expected to rise by 8.07o per annum. This provides
for a labor cost increase of 14.07, per annum.
** All other input variables in the various programs are relative constants
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The intensive financial analysis brought about by simulation of such a
wide range of national economic circumstances make it clear that the old
axiom about real estate financing remains true. The annual constant for
mortgage amortization imposes upon the mortgage lender the burden of accept-
ing cheaper dollars as inflationary policies continue. It is apparent, by
way of the computer analysis, that Sec. 235 and Sec. 236 are structured in
such a way that the "life of the subsidy" is always relatively short, what-
ever the reasonable expectations of rifek may be. This is because of the
high probability that the occupants' Income will rise while the mortgage pay-
ment, by contractual agreement, remains constant. In this way the federal
share diminishes as the occupants' share of the payment rises, A review of
the tables below will indicate the programs are workable. The computer pro-
24
gram is available on request.
Table 5 and 6 indicate a linear projection of the "most likely" subsidy,
and required "family-incomes" under both Sec. 236 and Sec. 235, respectively.
A comparison with Tables 2 and 3 will indicate that our estimate of family
incomes and the amount of the subsidy are showing a time-lag of about six to
twelve months. This is attributed more to the linear nature of our projec-
tions than any other causitive factor. In setting up our model we judged
that the federal government would find the level of inflation in 1969-1971
intolerable. Therefore, we rejected a 10-year compounded rate of change
based on the rate of inflation in 1965-1971. It should be obvious that we
chose to both start out v7ith a lower subsidy than would actually occur and
in later years have a higher subsidy than would occur. This was a result of
the simplicity of our model. We chose simplicity rather than attempt to imply
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the illusion of precision over such a long time-horizon. Another good ques-
tion which might be raised is why do we assume that people in the low- to
low-moderate -income brackets will have a rise in family income which will
cause them tp pay a higher share of the rent according to the "basic-rent"
and "market -rent" forraulaes? This factor was very carefully considered.
All we can do is point to the past rate of increase in nominal dollar incomes
and remind you that the debt service is paid by these inflated dollars. It
appears to be beyond question that the rising family income of the occupants
is a reasonable certainty, unless there is a maximum effort to thwart the
Inevitable by adverse tenant selection under (Sec, 236) by continuously seek-
25
ing out lower and lower income occupants. Such self-defeating tactics seem
improbable
.
Table 5
REPRESENTATIVE iEXAMPLE OF A SUBSIDY PROGRAM FOR A SECTION 236
APAHTHENT W^ELLIJiG
,
UNIT OCOOPANT F.«HIL¥-APARTMENT CONST. IM (1972)
Family Annual Annual Monthly
Year Income Net Rent Subsidy Subsidy
(Adjusted) (Basic)
1972 55,921.66 $1,480.42 $738.60 $61.55
1973 6,158.53 1,539.62 679.38 56.62
1974 6.404.37 1,601.20 617.80 51.48
1975 6,661.06 1.665.25 553.75 46.15
1976 6.927.51 1,731.86 487.14 40.60
1977 7.204.61 1,801.14 417.86 34.82
1978 7.492.79 1,873.18 345. S2 28.82
1979 7,792.50 1,948.11 270.89 22.57
1980 8,104.20 2,026.04 192.96 16.08
1981 8,428.37 2,107,08 111.92 9.33
1982 8,765.50 2,191.36 27.64 2.30
Assumptions: Cost of dwelling unlt--$15,090.00; Contract interest rate-- 7
percent + 1/2 percent FHA i.p.; Amortization t:erra--40 years; Market rental
charge--$184.00; Basic rental charge--$123. 37; Mini-raax range of family
Income eligible for admission to this dwelling unit--$4,800 to $7,400. We
further assumed that the ratio of maintenance costs would either remain con-
stant or, if increased, would be passed on to the tenant as increased rent
without affecting the subsidy.
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Table 5
REPRESENTATIVE EXAMPtE OF A SUBSIDY PROGRAM FOR SECTION 235,
S INGLE- FAMItY, 3-BEDROOM HOUSE FOR AN OCCUP.«n ELIGIBLE FOR THE
MAXIMUM SUBSIDY--HOUSE CONSTRUCTED IN 1972
Family
Year Income
(Adjusted)
1972 $5,960.29
1973 5,960.29
197^ 6,446.65
1975 6,446.65
1976 6,972.69
1977 6,972.69
1978 7,541.67
1979 7,541.67
1980 8,157.07
1981 8,157.07
1982 8,822.68
1983 8,822.68
1984 9,542.61
1985 9,542.61
Annual Maxitnura Sent
Paid by Owner «3 2Q7. ;.nnual
of Income BiennisUy Subsidy
Adjusted (Maximum)
$1,192.06 $817.27
1,192.06 817.27
1,289.33 720,00
1,289.33 720.00
1,394.54 614.79
1,394.54 614.79
1 , 508 . 34 500.99
1 , 508 . 34 500.99
1,631.42 377.91
1,631.42 377.91
1,764.54 244 . 79
1,764.54 244.79
1,908.52 100.81
1,908.52 100.81
Monthly
Subsidy
(Actual)
S66 . 10
68.10
60.00
60.00
51.23
51.23
41.75
41.75
31.49
31.49
20.40
20.40
8.40
8.40
Assianptions: Cost of dwelling unit--$17 ,800: Contract Interest rate-- 7
percent + 1/2 percent FHA l.p.; Amortization terBi--30 years; Monthly pay-
ment FHA full rate--$133.47 + $33.97 for taxes and Insurance <? 25 percent
of monthly payment--S167.44 full monthly payment <? Market rate; Monthly
payment principal and Interest 3 1 percent--$99.33; MaximisK subsidy is
$68.10/mo.; Total annual mortgage payment- -SI ,601.
The remaining tables--?, 8, 9, and 10 demonstrate beyond a reasonable
doubt that the interest subsidy programs appropriation costs are far below
the estimates ballyhooed by the mass media. Table 9 relates the range of
fair and reasonable estimates. It appears that :he cumulative total appro-
priations from the interest subsidy program might range from $14,393,480,000
to $18,789,260,000; payable in annual installments not exceeding $2.09 billion
in any case. Taking the higher cost of about $19 billion it must be said that
it compares favorably with the total costs of the aerospace program of the
recent administrations and v7ould result in the production of billions in
housing assets of substantial permanence when compared with the pyrotechnical
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display of the moonshot. Tne amazing difference between the $200 billion
estimate and the $19 billion set forth here must be largely attributed to the
differences in what are termed reasonable expectations as to the rates of
change in cost:s of production and family incomes overtime and naive extra-
polations of costs without considering benefits. It is hoped we have demon-
strated that the interest subsidy programs do stimulate production and that
the costs are reasonable in view of the production levels achieved.
The difficulties of such long-range forecasts which look into the future
as far as 1992 should be obvious. Too often in scholarly literature a fore-
cast is made by simply projecting past time-series forv;ard. In our computer
analysis great care was taken to judgmentally interrupt these trend lines
and make adjustments T^ich we believed would result from socio-economic and
political ramifications. An interesting case in point is our "pessimistic"
or trend III column in tables 7, S, and 9. In an inflationary economy we
assumed the demands for new plant and equipment, public construction, joined
with the oligopolistic power of the construction tiades unions, would exact
a 14 percent per annum increase in labor costs, something which did occur in
the years 1965-1972, on occasion. On the other hand we saw low- to low-moderate-
income occupants of subsidy housing unable to keep up with the pace of wage
increases of the construction trades even in a high rate of inflation. We
also felt that pressure from those on fixed income, and general concern about
soaring price levels, would result in slowing the pace of increase of family
incomes to a rate of 8 percent per annum. The result, not surprisingly, is
that the costs of the subsidy are actually lower In an highly inflationary
economy than in the mildly inflationary economy we are now experiencing, if
you accept the assvmiptions . Another possible weakness of the analysis is that
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we assumed the levels of production attributed to rehabilitation would be as
announced by the President in his report on the national housing goals. To do
so we must create a new rehabilitation industry, and a new multi-skill work
force to produce significant numbers of rehabilitated dwelling units. There
Is no indication this will occur. However, we had limited our task to an
evaluation of the Sec. 235 and Sec. 236 programs to date. It can be said the
nation did create an amazing number of new low- to low-moderate -income housing
units while at the same time we made a national trip to the moon. We believe
the rehabilitation levels could be achieved if the federal government were to
consider that a national goal. In the meanwhile because of the scandalous
misunderstandings created by the confused writings of the mass media we are
all facing the possibility of housing allowances.
Housing Allowances as an Alternative
Housing allowances are another form of redistribution of income more
akin to the negative income taxes. As stated by Nourse, in regard to the
negative income tax, "...Because of the redistribution of income there would
be a new array of rent bids for each of the existing housing units. At the
upper end of (income) distribution there would be no change in rank order of
bids, although each bid might be somewhat less. At the lower end, however,
there would be a new income floor (from the negative income tax) below which
families do not fall. ... .since the average income of families receiving
benefits has risen all bids of these families will tend to rise. Nevertheless,
with higher incomes higher bids can also be made for improvements in quality...
thus after the initial rise... in some cases their bid would be sufficient to
improve the quality of dwelling (occupied by the family). "^^ The advocates of
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housing allowances wish to go one step further. Rather than leave it to the
low-income families as to how much they mlgh!; spend on standard housing the
concept requires that the subsidy be spent on housing only. Obviously, vouchers
could be used as with our food stamps, or joint -payee checks could be used as
with the relocation adjustment allowances cf urban renewal experience. The
programs suggested are vague concerning how the taxpayer would be assured
the subsidized family was obtaining standard housing, and that standard hous-
ing would be available in sufficient supply to avoid a sudden "unreasonalbe"
escalation in rents due to short supply in that segment of the market. It is
an unfortunate truth that some studies have demonstrated that standard hous-
27ing is already in short supply for low- to low-moderate -income families. '
Much more important it is beyond question that the lack of code enforcement is
pervasive in our nation. In a study of 29 communities the General Accounting
Office (GAO) found that 28 did not have effective city-wide local code enforce-
ment. The Comptroller General in a report entitled, "Enforcement of Housing
Codes: How can it help achieve the Nation's Housing Goals" stated that HUD has
not used its legislative authority to halt funds for various federal housing
programs in order to require communities to adopt effective local code enforce-
28
ment programs. Problems don't go ax^ray by ignoring them. None of the plans
for housing allowances have demonstrated tight surveillance over the problem
of quality of housing or, whether or not the recipient of the housing allow-
ance will in fact be obtaining standard housing for the taxpayer's money. The
lack of code enforcement is only one major obstacle. There are very real
cultural barriers which discourage the low- and low-moderate -income families
from venturing out of the deteriorated ghetto areas with a government voucher in
hand. Housing allowance programs might require the landlord to accept a standard
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lease which would guarantee code compliance and warranties of fitness of
habitability and fair average quality. Also it appears a new kind of
"caseworker," might be necessary to imake inspections of the physical
conditions to determine for the taxpayer that the housing allowance recip-
ient was obtaining a standard dwelling. Another major problem with the
housing allowance program is that due to the mobility of the tenants;
possible politically inspired withdrawals of support; and lack of a long-
term federal contribution contract, it could take many years to convince
the producers of housing that they should produce in response to this
"non-economic" demand where the "ability to pay" is dependent on the largess
of changing government.
There is little reason to have confidence that housing allowances will
produce fewer scandals than the Sec. 223(e) "deteriorated neighborhood
mortgages" which were to be covered by a congressional special risk fund.
Worse, unlike the Sec. 235 and Sec. 236 intc-est subsidy programs which have
produced a substantial vol'jme of housing it seems unlikely housing allowances
will act as an incentive to bolster production. The glimmer of hope is that
the 221(d) (4) program will be modified to include site selection criteria
such as in the Sec. 236 multifamily program. The 221(d) (4) low- to low-
moderate -housing projects are without subsidy of any kind. They are profit
motivated and have no special rent controls or income limits. Recipients of
housing allowances and leased housing could be among the new occupants of
221(d) (4) projects.
In the end we must remember former Senator Paul Douglas's words, after
his investigation of our urban problems in 1968. In summary, he said that
the way the many costs of housing fit together; we should keep in mind there
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is no panacea, we must work on reducing Che costs of each item and by summing
small savings to bring about a significant reduction in cost to our low- and
moderate -income families. Such a complex economic good as housing can have
no simple solution to the problem of delivering it in adequate supply, of
decent quality, and at convenient locations. We must retain all the programs
which are workable if we are to solve this problem of market failure by way
of adopting the mixed enterprise of government and urban housing development.
Conclusions
First, it appears we have established beyond a reasonable doubt that
Sec. 235 (new) and Sec. 236 (new) interest subsidy programs are working well
enough to be continued. Sec. 235 rehabilitation and Sec. 236 rehabilitation
programs should be limited to viable neighborhoods in which no more than spot
(20 percent) blighting has occurred and in which systematic code compliance
activity is a hard reality. The use of these programs in an effort to stem
the tide of advanced deterioration is unworkable without neighborhood rehabil-
itation and renewal of the municipal infrastructure.
Second, the ill-fated Sec. 223(e) "deteriorated" neighborhoods mortgage
program must be brought to an end. Tliis experiment with the waiving of under-
writing standards, though theoretically feasible, has been proven to be beyond
the capacities of FHA-HUD underwriting personnel.
Third, housing allowances and leased public housing should be pushed
forward along with 221(d) (4) and turn key pub lie -housing development to
increase the stock of standard housing available to low- and low-moderate-
income families and accelerate the exodus of delapidated uninhabited housing
from our national inventory.
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Fourth, as stated elsewhere, the overall costs of the interest subsidy
programs could be substantially reduced by using federal full-faith and credit
tax-free municipal bonds through local agencies as is now done with public
housing authority notes. Alternative cost could be reduced by direct financing
through GNiMA.
Finally, we must deal with the body politic. This report demonstrates the
effectiveness of the interest subsidy programs. They have been an incentive
to our housing developers to produce an unprecedented volume of new low- to
low-moderate -income housing. The problems of the programs in the early years
(1969-1972) primarily relate to suboptimization resulting from an overloading
of the managerial capacity of HUD-FHA. Human capital, like machinery and
equipment will break down if operated at rates which are over capacity. The
problems of this overload (i.e. lax underwriting, incompetent appraising)
have adversely effected the political acceptability of the programs. Because
the major voices of the communication media lag far behind housing economists
in their understanding of the nature and quality of housing demand (e.g. their
continuing support of filtering). They seem to be unaware of the market's
failures. The result is, the taxpayer is misled into believing the programs
don't work and are wasteful. In fact, the cultural lag is so great that the
media even represent that "market filtering" does work; in that it effectively
improves the quality of housing available to low-income families in the short-
run, in spite of clear evidence to the contrary. The major obstacle to
accelerating the availability of decent housing for every American family at
convenient locations is ideological opposition. It appears likely that what-
ever form the welfare transfer payment takes a program national in scope will
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have such vigorous opposition that elected officials will find it politically
unsupportable after a few years. The life of such programs is short in a
democracy with a free press. Consideration should be given to a lower, regional,,
political profile such as the EDA-Appalachian program. Housing programs in
S^BA selected on the basis of their high percentage of: substandard housing,
concentrated high density poverty enclaves; abandoned neighborhoods, respon-
sible levels of code compliance activities, etc.; would produce a significant
volume of housing production at convenient locations without awakening un-
reasoning opposition.
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APPENDIX
Table 7
SO^MAKY TABLE SECTION 235
Bstlaated Annual and Cunulatlve Costs Co the Federal Government of Subsidizing the Interest Payments
In the HUD Section 235 (Sales Housing) Program In Accordance with Federal Annual Contribution
Contracts Required to Meet the National Housing Goals from 1969 to 1978. Assumption: Market
Interests Rates; I » 67., II - 7.5X, III « 8.57. (Inc. FHA Insurance Premiums).
Land Cost Increase • 6% annually *
No. of Units to Estimated Cumulative Estimated Cumulative Estimated Cumulative
be Constructed Annual Sub- Cost CO U.S. Annual Sub- Coat to U.S. Annual Sub- Cost to U.S
Year or Rehabilitated
new rehab
sidy (? 67. (? 6% sidy 9 7.bX & 7.5% sidy (a 8.57. 9 8.57.
(000 omitted) (000.000 omitted) (000,000 omitted) (000,000 omitted)
I - 67. * II - 7.57. * III - .a. 57. *
1968
1969 55 30 $ 39.50 $ 39.50 $ 53.39 $ 53.39 $ 63.06 $ 63.06
1970 70 40 92.77 132.26 125.58 178.97 150.48 213.54
1971 80 45 151.18 283.44 205.32 384.29 242.53 456.07
1972 80 45 210.74 494.13 287.00 671.29 336.82 792.89
1973 80 45 266.80 760.98 364.51 1,035.80 417.77 1,210.66
1974 80 45 323.81 1,084.80 443.72 1,479.51 499. 3Z 1,710.02
1975 80 45 376.83 1,461.62 518.01 1,997.52 564.27 2,274.29
1976 100 60 452.32 1.913.94 623.61 2,621.13 670.10 2,944.39
1977 100 60 524.27 2,438.21 724.94 3,346.07 768.72 3,713.10
1978 100 60 594.90 3,033.11 825.21 4,171.28 861.35 4.574.46
1979 545.30 3.578.41 759.04 4,930.32 714.32 5,288.78
;980 4S8.44 4,066.85 683.09 5,613.41 544.26 5,833.03
1981 437.25 4,504.10 611.91 6,225.32 419.50 6,252.53
1982 378.92 4,883.02 530.22 6,755.55 272.23 6.524.76
19«3 327.93 5.210.95 457.11 7,212.66 181.65 6.706.42
1984 269.88 5,480.83 373.92 7.586.57 77.27 6,783.69
1985 223.53 5.704.35 307.89 7,894.46 40.07 $6,823.76
1986 171.06 5,875.41 233.78 8,128.24
1987 133.58 6,008.99 180.26 8,308.50
1988 91.58 6,100.57 118.91 8,427.40
1989 66.41 6,166.99 80.61 8,508.02
1990 37.80 $6,204.79 36.78 8,544.79
1991 18.83 $8,563.62
1992

Table 8
SUMMARY TABLE SECTION 236
Estimated Annual and Cumulative Coats to the Federal Government of Subsidizing the Interest Payments
in the HUD Section 236 (Multi-Family Projects) Program in Accordance with Federal Annual Contribution
Contracts Required to Meet the National Housing Goals from 1969 to 1978. Assumptions: Market Inter-
ests Rates; I = 6Z, II = 7.57., Ill = 8.57, (inc. FHA Insurance Premiums). Land Cost Increase 6%
annually *
No. of Units to Estimated Cumulative E:stimated Cumulative Elstimated Cumulative
be Constructed Annual Sub- Cost to U.S. Annual Sub- Cost to U.S. Annual Sub- Cost to U.S
Year or Rehabilitated sidy @ 67. @ 67. sidy @ 7.57. (3 7.57. sidy (? 8.57. (? 8.5%
new rehab
(000 omitted) (000,000 omitted) (000.000 omitted) (000,000 omitted)
I - 67. * 11 - 7.57. * III - 18.57. *
1969 60 30 $ 38.74 $ 38.74 $ 52.66 $ 52.66 $ 62.33 $ 62-. 33
1970 65 35 80.74 119.48 109.58 162.25 127.37 189.70
1971 75 35 126.60 246.08 171.52 333.77 195.26 384.96
1972 95 45 185.66 431.74 251.23 584.99 281.15 666.10
1973 120 55 260.84 692.57 352,63 937.63 388.65 1.054.76
1974 170 80 373.55 1,066.12 505.26 1,442.88 555.14 1,609.90
1975 200 100 509.70 1,575.82 689.30 2.132.18 754.47 2,364.37
1976 220 130 667.85 2,243.67 902.43 3,034.61 989.50 3,353.87
1977 270 80 827.09 3,070.77 1 ,115.39 4,150.00 1 ,220.13 4,574.00
1978 220 80 943.59 4,014.36 1 ,265.74 5,415.74 1 ,350.55 5,924.55
1979 ..- ... 846.53 4,860.89 1 ,112.12 6,527.85 1 ,019.23 6,943.78
1980 746.55 5,607.44 956.63 7,484.48 704.54 7,648.32
1981 644.73 6.252.17 801.94 8,286.43 426.43 8,074,75
1982 544.00 6, 79b. 17 649.24 8,935.67 204.47 8,279.23
1983 445.06 7,241.24 500.92 9,436.59 58 . 69 $8,337.91
1984 349.00 7,590.23 360.53 9,797.19
1985 257.79 7,848.03 234.60 10,031.72
1986 174.45 8,022.48 130.02 10,161.74
1987 103.49 8,125.97 53.55 10,215 29
1988 48.79 8,174.77 10.35 $10,225.64
1989 13.92 $8,188.69
1990
* See Table 4 Assurapttons

Year
Table 9
SIMHARY TABLE OF COST OF INTEREST SUBSIDY PROGRAMS
Eatlmated Annual and Cmulaclve Co'jCs to Che Federal Government of all the Federal Annual
Contributions Required to Subsidize Interest Costs Under Section 235 and Section 236
National Housing Prograns for Housing Constructed In Accordance with the National
Housing Coals 1969-1978. Assumptions: Market Interests Rates; I « 67.,
II - T.SX, III - e.Sy. (Inc. FHA Insurance Premiums),
Se« Table ^ for other Asi sumptions
No. of Units Con-
structed and Re-
habilitated Under
Both FrogratDS
(000 ooltted)
Necessary Angiml Congressional
Appropriation Both P> ^grains
I (6%) II (7.5T.) Ill .'8.5%)
(000,000 omitted)
fiimillaflYP Total of
Appropriations
(6"i) II (7.57.) Ill (8.57.)
(000.000 omitted)
1968 ... ... ...
1969 175 $ 78.24 $ 106.05 5 123,3? $ 78.24 $ 106.05 $ 125.39
1970 210 173.51 235.16 277.85 251.74 341.22 403.24
1971 235 277,78 376.84 437.79 529.52 718.06 841.03
1972 265 396.40 538.23 617.97 925.92 1.256.28 1,458.99
1973 300 527.64 717.14 306.42 1,453.55 1.973.43 2,265.42
1974 425 697.36 948.98 1 ,054.51 2,150.92 2,922,39 3,319.92
1975 510 886.53 ,207.31 1 ,318.74 3,037.44 4,149,70 4,638.65
1976 SIO ,130.17 ,526.04 1 ,659.60 4,157.61 5,655,74 6,298.26
1977 460 .351.36 ,840.33 1 .988.85 5,508.98 7,496.07 8,287.10
1978 ... ,538.49 ,090,95 1 ,111.90 7,047.47 9,587,02 10,499.01
1979 ,391,83 ,871.16 1 ,733.55 8,439.30 11,458.17 12,232.56
1980 ... ,234.99 ,639.72 1 ,248.80 9,674.29 13,097.89 13,481.35
1981 ... ,081.98 ,413.85 845.93 10,756.27 14,511.75 14,327.28
1982 ... 922.92 ,179.46 476.70 11,579.19 15,591.22 14.803.99
1983 772,99 958.03 240.34 12.452.19 16,649.2'5 15,044.33
1984 ... 618.68 734.45 77.27 13,071.06 17.383.76 15,121.60
1985 ... 481.32 542.49 $ 40.07 13,552.38 17,925.18 15,161.67
1986 ... 345.51 363.80 13,897.89 18,289.98
1988 ... 237,07 233,81 14,134.96 18.523.79
1989 ... 140.37 129.26 14,275.34 18.653.04
1990 ... 30,33 80.16 14,355.68 18,733.66
1991 ... 5 37.80 36.78 $14,393.48 18,770,43
1992 ... ... S 18.83 ... ... $18,789.26 ...
1993 ...
1994
1995
Table 10
SECTION 2 35 AND 236 FH/. MORTGAGE AT 7.57, "MOST LIKKLY" PROCRAMS
ESTIMATED ANNUAL DWEI-LING UNIT C^ST AIJD DEMANDS FOR MORTGAGE CPXDIT
Estliaated Annual and Cusiulative Pwelling Unl . Cost. Requiring Mortgage Financing For Both
Sections 235 and 236 FHA Mortgage Insurance P-ograos. The Table Displays Both Annual
Unit Cost and Demand For Mortgnge Fundi, Undtr "Kost Likely" Assumptions. *
2 ?5 ?36
NevI Rehobllitated
Total
Ne(i Rehabilitated Cumulative
Total Total Total Cost of all
Year Unit Cost Units Unit Cost Unit;, Unit Cost Units Unit Cost Units Programs
1969 $15,410.45 55,000 $11,300.99 30 , DOC $lJ.0-'1.29 60,000 $ 9,725.65 30,000 $ 2,252,652
1970 16,158.13 70.000 11,831.92 40 , ,100 13.721.42 65.000 10,228.28 35,000 5.117,795
1971 16.963.42 80,000 12,430. '.6 45.000 14,385.28 75.000 10,757.26 35,000 8.489,644
1972 17.798.22 80.000 13,038.35 45.000 15.091,48 95,000 11,313.99 45,000 12,443.047
1973 18.674.50 80,000 13.675.81 45,000 15.832.67 120.000 11,899.96 55,000 17,106.882
1974 19.594.36 80,000 14,347.54 45.000 16,610,61 170.000 12.516.72 80,000 23,145,210
1975 20,559.97 80.000 15,052.22 45,000 17,427,14 200.000 13,165.92 100.000 30,269,378
1976 21.573.65 100,000 15,792.66 60,000 18,284.20 220.000 13.849.28 130.000 39.177,230
1977 22.637.82 100,000 16.570.61 60,000 19,183.82 270,000 14.558.64 80.000 48.780.370
1978 $23,755.02 100,000 $17,388.15 60,000 $20,128.13 220.000 $15,325.91 80.000 $57,853,423
* See Rot* - Table 4 Assumptlona
At the "Optialatlc" Intereat rate (6%) the cumulative cost of all programs would be:
1969 - »2. 262. 652.000; 1975 - $29,893,975,000; 1978 - $56,766,714,000.
At the "Peaslalstlc" Interest rate (8.57.) the ctnulatlve cost of all programs would be:
1969 - $2,262,652,000; 1975 - $33,231,070,000; 1978 - $56,919,357,000.







